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1.  Introduction1 
In August 2016 a working group of the International Commission on Stratigraphy provisionally 
recommended that the current time interval be renamed to recognize the new geological ‘age of 
mankind’: the Anthropocene. Interpretations of the new epoch are hotly contested. Nonetheless, 
at the heart of many popular and historical understandings of the new era lies a dilemma of 
abundance.  
The mainstream historical narrative locates the key moment of the Anthropocene’s 
emergence in the West around 1800 with the invention and spread of steam engines. In this 
account, the modern economy was founded on the shattering of the old Malthusian constraints 
imposed by the natural world. Britain tore past its previously successful counterparts in Asia, 
thanks in large part to its access to abundant land and especially coal.2 This fossil-fuel 
revolution, and its second waves based on electricity and oil, brought with it the promise of 
apparently endless economic growth. Such a narrative has been echoed both by climate scientists 
                                                       
1 I am grateful to conference participants at the University of Chicago, the Australian National University, and 
Boston College, and especially to Tyler Williams, Faridah Zaman, and Fredrik Albritton Jonsson, for their 
thoughtful responses to earlier versions of this piece.  
2 Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); E.A. Wrigley, Energy and the English Industrial Revolution 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). At least until the Anthropocene Working Group announced 
that it provisionally favoured an official start-date around 1950, the emphasis on Europe around 1800 was the 
‘dominant scholarly consensus’ on the Anthropocene; see Alan Mikhail, ‘Enlightenment Anthropocene,’ 
Eighteenth-Century Studies 49, no. 2 (2016): 222 and references therein.  
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and by perhaps the most influential critique of the Anthropocene to come out of the humanities 
thus far: the claim that the new era’s hallmark was the emergence of the steam-driven capitalist 
socioeconomic system—‘fossil capitalism’—and that it might therefore be more accurately 
labelled the ‘Capitalocene’.3  While the Anthropocene Working Group has shifted instead 
towards a date around 1950, economic historians have continued to argue that ‘the decisive 
process was that which launched what became the incomplete but worldwide spread of 
industrialization’.4  
All this came at the cost of environmental and social degradation. The apparent material 
abundance enjoyed by Western elites in particular was revealed to be running headlong into 
systemic planetary limits, limits which do not neatly coincide with ‘peak’ coal, oil, or natural 
gas. This is the popular tragedy of the Anthropocene, and the root of fundamental debates 
about the future of economy and society, at least in the global North: ‘we cannot agree on 
whether the world we relate to is one fundamentally defined by scarcity (and thus limits) or by 
abundance (and thus unlimited potential).’5  
But what of the world beyond the northwestern corner of Europe and its North Atlantic 
offshoot? Imitating standard, Enlightenment-tinged accounts of ‘the birth of the modern world’, 
the influential ‘Capitalocene’ thesis that dominates the still-emergent economic history literature 
on the Anthropocene locates virtually all the key actors—inventors, colonialists, and 
capitalists—in Europe and the United States. The fossil economy’s beneficiaries are depicted as 
                                                       
3 Andreas Malm and Alf Hornborg, ‘The Geology of Mankind? A Critique of the Anthropocene Narrative,’ 
Anthropocene Review 1, no. 1 (2014); Andreas Malm, Fossil Capital: The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots 
of Global Warming (London; New York: Verso, 2016). The most vociferous exponent of the ‘Capitalocene’ 
label, Jason W. Moore, emphasizes the opening of the New World colonies over coal, but abundance in the 
Euro-Atlantic world still lies at the heart of his account; see Capitalism in the Web of Life: Ecology and the 
Accumulation of Capital (London; New York: Verso, 2015). 
4 Gareth Austin, ‘Introduction,’ in Economic Development and Environmental History in the Anthropocene: 
Perspectives on Asia and Africa, ed. Gareth Austin (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2017), 6. The impact of 
the Capitalocene thesis likely owes much to lack of competition, given the persistent gulf between economic 
and environmental history.  
5 Joshua J. Yates, ‘Abundance on Trial: The Cultural Significance of Sustainability,’ Hedgehog Review 14, no. 2 
(2012): 22–23. 
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an industrial and commercial elite minority, in contradistinction to the mass of the population. 
Beyond this heartland, the rest of the world features largely as a passive resource pool6 or 
imitators of a peculiarly Euro-American development model. Such literature often assumes a 
neat process whereby fossil capitalism was transmitted from northwest Europe to its colonial 
peripheries, either through a process of mechanistic diffusion—the ‘“westernisation” of the 
world’7—or via coercion by ‘a clique of white British men’.8 This is perhaps unsurprising, given 
that its authors are typically specialists on early modern or Victorian Europe, but it neglects a 
rich body of revisionist history on the economy, the environment, and technological 
development in the global South.  
This chapter suggests that in its focus on abundance the Capitalocene thesis 
misdiagnoses both the dynamics of fossil capitalism’s spread beyond its original heartlands, and 
the degree of hegemony and coherence it displayed thereafter. Late development is a condition 
characterized by new forms of and a new consciousness of scarcity—of remaining behind in the 
waiting room of Malthusian subsistence while the elites of the developed world revel in the new 
material surfeit. Indeed, the starting point for one recent collection was the speculation that 
scarcity acts as a totalizing discourse of modernity in the global South in the way that risk does 
in the North, naturalizing a turn to scientific and technological fixes.9 If abundance was the 
precondition of the Euro-American fossil economy, how did fossil capitalism spread and 
                                                       
6 This is true even of one recent attempt to grant colonialism a central place in the Capitalocene narrative, the 
idea of the ‘Plantationocene’, in which world history is read off the unusual colonial experience of the 
Americas. See Donna Haraway, ‘Anthropocene, Capitalocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin,’ 
Environmental Humanities 6, no. 1 (2015): 162. 
7 Elmar Altvater, ‘The Social and Natural Environment of Fossil Capitalism,’ in Coming to Terms with Nature: 
Socialist Register 2007, ed. Colin Leys and Leo Panitch (London; New York; Halifax: Merlin Press, 2007), 37. 
See similarly Christophe Bonneuil and Jean-Baptiste Fressoz, The Shock of the Anthropocene (London; New 
York: Verso, 2016). As Julia Adeney Thomas argues in her forthcoming review of the latter for Social History: 
‘The old diffusionist model of “human technology” arising exclusively in the West until the 1850s when it 
“reached a global scale” is recuperated without acknowledging the research dislodging this Eurocentric 
modernization narrative.’ 
8 Malm and Hornborg, ‘Geology of Mankind?’, 3; Malm, Fossil Capital, 267. 
9 Lyla Mehta, ed. The Limits to Scarcity: Contesting the Politics of Allocation (London; Washington, DC: 
Earthscan, 2010), xxi. The volume concluded that this is true of the global North too, and deconstructed the 
universalized notion of scarcity across multiple regional settings.  
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develop in settings where scarcity was the norm? Were the beneficiaries of the fossil economy 
always fossil capitalists, and to what degree did they succeed in ensuring that electricity was 
governed along recognizably capitalist lines? More fundamentally, can Northern living 
standards be universalized for the South’s huge populations without asphyxiating humankind, 
or must the latter be expected to embrace comparative scarcity voluntarily?  
To answer these questions this chapter focuses on India, now a key case as the world’s 
third-largest national carbon emitter, and takes as its lens the spread of electrification. On-grid, 
utility-scale electricity was the great macro-technology of the twentieth-century fossil economy 
(and a critical enabler of the twenty-first-century knowledge economy), a crucial input that 
reshaped capitalism from factory technologies to the rise of finance. It also lies at the 
intersection of fossil capitalism and distributive politics, touching virtually every dimension of 
everyday life, at least in electrified areas. Finally, power generation is now the single largest 
source of anthropogenic carbon emissions worldwide, placing it at the centre of the 
contemporary environmental crisis. The history of electricity in India therefore provides a rich 
case through which to view one trajectory of fossil capitalism beyond its Atlantic origins and 
into the postcolonial era.  
The following analysis first examines how this crucial macro-technology of fossil 
capitalism arrived in India (Section 2). Against the assumption of a seamless dissemination of 
the fossil economy, the elements of colonialism, fossil capitalism, and rising energy consumption 
did not neatly align before 1947, the year of Indian independence. Outside favoured elite 
pockets the imperial regime was largely indifferent to electrification, which instead often relied 
on local initiative and capital. In this way colonialism helped to produce a new consciousness of 
scarcity, as power became a crucial industrial input and, for nationalists, a defining 
characteristic of the modernity that the colonial regime denied its peripheries. 
5 
Yet, against the emphasis on corporate, export-driven manufacturing that so preoccupies 
Capitalocene theorists,10 it was not only industrial capitalism that relied upon fossil fuels. 
Agriculture, infrastructure, lighting, welfare provision, urban life, household labour, public 
communication, and even democracy have also become increasingly dependent upon energy 
abundance. We might thus more accurately analyse the spread of a broader fossil 
developmentalism than fossil capitalism.  
The chapter therefore turns to explore how the persistent scarcity of electricity came to 
intersect with fossil developmentalism in the formally democratic context of postcolonial India, 
examining this question from first a society-centric and then a state-centric perspective. Against 
the Capitalocene emphasis on the hegemony of industrial and commercial capitalists and the 
seemingly inexorable process of the commodification of natural resources, political pressures to 
obtain scarce power came to be exercised both within and without the democratic process in 
ways that often undermined fossil capitalists’ access to electricity in favour of agricultural and 
residential consumers (Section 3), and subverted attempts to impose conventional economic 
rationality on bureaucratic power governance (Section 4). As this suggests, it is important to 
separate out a ‘hard’, absolute scarcity of electricity (the quantity of power generated) from the 
‘soft’ scarcity created through the unequal politics of its frontline distribution, which creates 
asymmetric shortages for different categories of consumer; both types of scarcity are socially 
produced—though they are also inseparable from natural resource constraints and electricity’s 
physical characteristics—but their policy implications are quite different. Neither the political 
economy nor the governing logic of the Indian electricity supply industry is well captured by 
Capitalocene historiography derived from Euro-American experiences. Defined by endemic 
scarcities, the history of electrification in India thus illustrates the complexity of the much-
                                                       
10 See especially Malm, Fossil Capital.  
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debated relationships between energy abundance and colonialism, fossil capitalism, and 
democracy outside the global North.  
  
2.  Generating scarcity: electricity in the colonial era    
Mainstream Anthropocene-Capitalocene literature condemns colonialism for spreading carbon-
intensive technologies such as ‘[t]rans-continental canals, railways, steamships, docks, grain silos 
and telegraph lines’, as noted above.11 But did European colonialism really lead to such a neat 
diffusion of fossil capitalism? A substantial body of revisionist economic and environmental 
history scholarship suggests this is too simplistic: even if it did not actively encourage 
deindustrialization, colonialism did not simply gift capital- and energy-intensive development to 
its peripheries.12  
This is especially true if we move beyond the ‘canonical’ technologies of empire such as 
railways and telegraphs to examine absences in the archival record and on the ground alike. No 
absence is more notable than electricity. Electrification, as the political scientist Sunila Kale 
recently noted, was largely ‘incidental’ to imperialism into the early twentieth century—and 
therefore to subsequent historical scholarship on the British Empire.13  
Colonial India illuminates the limits of imperial interest. In the capital, the Calcutta 
Electric Supply Corporation (CESC) began operations in 1899, only 17 years after London and 
New York’s first generating stations. But outside colonial residential zones, military complexes, 
and industrial belts around the major cities, electrification was rare. Before 1920 the limited 
capacity additions that did materialize were generally used more to regulate the population—
                                                       
11 Bonneuil and Fressoz, Shock, 238. 
12 In India the deindustrialization debate dates back to the early nationalist movement. It remains much 
contested, especially around textiles. Even if colonialism did not crush local production, as sceptics suggest, 
technological transfer was clearly limited; see Tirthankar Roy, The Economic History of India, 1857–1947 
(New Delhi; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 114–53. 
13 Sunila S. Kale, ‘Structures of Power: Electrification in Colonial India,’ Comparative Studies of South Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East 34, no. 3 (2014): 455. 
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lighting prisons, government offices, arms factories, and lighthouses—rather than directly 
prioritizing economic development in the fossil-capitalist mode.14 There was a slow, regionally 
differentiated take-off of hydroelectric projects from the 1920s. Nonetheless, senior officials 
often remained indifferent, despite growing calls from local elites—both Indian and occasionally 
colonial—to install grids and support new provincial generation capacity. 
The situation was somewhat better in some princely States, such as Mysore under the 
celebrated administration of M. Visvesvaraya, or in Bombay, where a hydroelectric plant owned 
by the local entrepreneurial Tata dynasty contributed half of all India’s installed capacity as late 
as 1917.15 As this suggests, indigenous rulers, officials, entrepreneurs, and investors were crucial 
in electricity’s early spread. The share of foreign ownership in installed generation capacity 
correspondingly fell from around 80 percent in 1913-14 to only 31 percent in 1928-32.16 This 
was no passive process of technological ‘diffusion’, but a collaborative process in which local 
capital and initiative played a key role.  
Cultural diffusion and skill transfers did not seamlessly accompany the geographical 
relocation of technologies, however. Torn between a dearth of imported personnel and 
scepticism about Indians’ technical abilities, the colonial regime was slow to encourage 
engineering education.17 Senior engineers, even in Indian utilities, were often British, German, or 
American, and even after independence India continued to rely on imported technology and 
foreign or multinational technical expertise for some years. British engineers and managing 
agencies stayed on in some utilities well into the 1950s.  
                                                       
14 Srinivasa Rao and John Lourdusamy, ‘Colonialism and the Development of Electricity: The Case of Madras 
Presidency, 1900–47,’ Science, Technology & Society 15, no. 1 (2010): 29–33. 
15 Ibid; Kale, ‘Structures of Power.’ 
16 William J. Hausman, Peter Hertner, and Mira Wilkins, Global Electrification: Multinational Enterprise and 
International Finance in the History of Light and Power, 1878–2007 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008), 32. 
17 See Daniel R. Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress: Technology Transfer in the Age of Imperialism, 1850–
1940 (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988).  
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As a result, in 1947 the entire generation capacity of the Indian electricity sector stood at 
a mere 1,362 MW, less than 0.5 percent of installed capacity in 2016. One historian concludes: 
‘At the time of its Independence, India had an electrical industry which reached the level of 
European nations just before 1914’; the reason it did not opt for full nationalization was ‘that 
there was actually nothing much to nationalize’.18 This underdevelopment was castigated by 
nationalists, who argued in 1938 that electricity was ‘the very life blood of the industrial nation 
which must flow abundantly and without interruption if the nation’s strength and well-being are 
to be preserved’.19 Even Gandhians, often parodied as hostile to every trapping of industrial 
modernization, recognized the practical benefits of large-scale power generation.20  
India’s fate strikingly contrasted with that of Japan. The latter quickly developed a 
prodigious local electricity industry and by 1935 had electrified 89 percent of households, 
significantly outstripping Britain and the United States.21 This was in spite of a lack of natural 
resources in some ways even more striking than that of India. Asian societies were evidently 
more than able to assimilate electrical technologies outside colonial control. The continent’s 
divergent histories of electrification again suggest the significance of imperial ambivalence about 
technological transfer to the colonies, as well as the heterogeneity of non-Western energy 
histories.  
Instead of a simplistic and linear process of diffusion, then, the electric avatar of Euro-
American-style fossil capitalism arrived in India haphazardly, reluctantly, and belatedly; and it 
was translated into new contexts with the collaboration of indigenous players. As the novelist 
Amitav Ghosh recently argued, in relation to climate change ‘it is demonstrably the case that the 
                                                       
18 Pierre Lanthier, ‘From the Raj to Independence: British Investment in the Indian Electricity Sector,’ Utilities 
Policy 29 (2014): 46, 49. 
19 K.T. Shah, Power and Fuel: Report of the Sub-Committee, Indian National Congress Planning Committee 
(Bombay: Vora, 1949), 71. 
20 Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s Civilizing Mission 
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2006), 273.  
21 Brett L. Walker, A Concise History of Japan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 174.  
9 
imperatives of capital and empire have often pushed in different directions, sometimes 
producing counter-intuitive results’.22 The history of electricity in India thus provides a much 
more ambivalent account of colonialism and its relationship to industrial capitalism and climate 
change than that admitted by historians of the ‘Capitalocene’.  
More than this, there were already signs that electricity’s role in postcolonial India was 
to be expanded well beyond private industry. B.R. Ambedkar—famous as the leading advocate 
for India’s Dalits (former ‘untouchables’) and later the principal drafter of India’s constitution, 
but who also chaired the committee on public utilities and electricity under the colonial 
regime—declared in a 1943 speech that ‘without cheap and abundant electricity no effort for the 
industrialization of India can succeed’. This was not for the sake of capitalist enterprise, 
Ambedkar emphasized: ‘we want industrialization in India as the surest means to rescue the 
people from the eternal cycle of poverty in which they are caught’.23 The stage was set for the 
shift from narrow fossil capitalism towards a far more ambitious vision of fossil 
developmentalism that would draw quite different constituencies into its ambit. 
 
3.  Democratizing scarcity: the politics of allocation 
At independence, then, India inherited a new, hitherto unimagined scarcity in electricity. This 
was exacerbated by a series of related and overlapping scarcities in technology, skilled 
personnel, capital, and wealthy consumers willing and able to pay for service. Yet if the 
Japanese counterexample appears to suggest a link between national sovereignty and the uptake 
of electricity, the shift from colonial autocracy to democratic independence in India would not 
neatly provision fossil capitalists with electricity. The new government’s developmental vision 
                                                       
22 Amitav Ghosh, The Great Derangement: Climate Change and the Unthinkable (Gurgaon, India: Allen Lane, 
2016), 117. 
23 Quoted in Sunila S. Kale, Electrifying India: Regional Political Economies of Development (Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 2014), 32.  
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and democratic politics instead intersected with these multiple scarcities in complex ways, 
undermining the consolidation of fossil capitalism even while fostering the broader spread of 
fossil developmentalism beyond private industry.  
 If the relationship between colonialism and fossil capitalism is an ambivalent one, the 
connection between fossil capitalism and democracy is even more fraught. Several scholars have 
suggested it is no coincidence that the expansion of formal rights and the advent of fossil 
capitalism broadly coincided in western Europe. Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued that ‘[t]he 
mansion of modern freedoms stands on an ever-expanding base of fossil-fuel use’.24 It does seem 
that some minimum level of individual wealth and consumption is generally necessary for 
democracy’s consolidation: political-science orthodoxy predicts that democracy is much more 
likely to survive in wealthier countries—where, almost universally, energy consumption is 
higher.25 The mainstays of substantive democratic engagement—basic health, education, public 
safety, political communication, mass media, even voting itself—are all facilitated by 
electrification. Turning from energy consumption to production, Timothy Mitchell has 
(controversially) argued for a more direct link, contending that democracy’s development owed 
much to the physical characteristics of the coal industry and its empowerment of the labour 
movement, even as the shift to oil has undermined democracy in turn: ‘Fossil fuels helped create 
both the possibility of modern democracy and its limits.’26 To complicate matters, this is a two-
way relationship: drawing on satellite light data, Brian Min finds that democracies are in general 
                                                       
24 Dipesh Chakrabarty, ‘The Climate of History: Four Theses,’ Critical Inquiry 35, no. 2 (2009): 208. 
25  Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 
Legitimacy,’ American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959). The democratic deconsolidation occurring in 
some advanced economies today might call this into question, of course. 
26 Timothy Mitchell, Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil (London: Verso, 2011), 1, 12–27. 
By attributing mass mobilization to the structure of the coal industry, Mitchell’s materialism ignores the long 
pre-mining history of labour activism with its many alternative sources of radicalism. I am grateful to Fredrik 
Albritton Jonsson for this point.  
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more likely to provide electricity than authoritarian states.27 Energy consumption thus facilitated 
both the development and the consolidation of democracy, while democracy in turn encouraged 
a broadening of electricity consumption. 
In such terms, India is an outlier. There universal voting rights preceded a dramatic take-
off of economic development, widespread literacy, or per capita energy consumption, and yet 
formal democracy was successfully consolidated.28 The very fact of democracy’s survival in India 
thereby defies conventional wisdom, let alone the Capitalocene thesis. How, then, did fossil 
capitalism and democracy intersect in a situation where multiple scarcities persisted?  
Examining the contrast between the famines of colonial India and independent India’s 
relative freedom from dramatic starvation, Amartya Sen famously argued that food scarcity is 
often socially produced.29 He thereby usefully shifted attention from supply to questions of 
access and distribution—though subsequent scholars have noted that while sensational famines 
ceased, democratic India has failed to solve the problem of chronic malnutrition.30 The Indian 
power sector, too, has witnessed a slow-burning crisis virtually from independence. Yet, as in 
the case of food, this has not been solely a question of increasing overall supplies. As one 
commentator noted, from 1947 India consistently invested substantial sums in electricity; the 
sector is not at the global technological frontier and so catch-up should not have been difficult; 
and the country boasted a number of energy experts, often producing official reports that 
astutely diagnosed the sector’s difficulties.31 As in the case of food, then, the interaction of 
                                                       
27 Brian Min, Power and the Vote: Elections and Electricity in the Developing World (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015).  
28 The exception is the 21-month Emergency of 1975-7, Indira Gandhi’s brief suspension of formal democracy. 
During this time electricity featured as a weapon of both state coercion and populism: one of Mrs Gandhi’s first 
moves was to cut power supplies to major newspapers, while her 20-point programme promised rapid 
electrification. 
29 Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981). See also 
Mehta, this volume.  
30 Dan Banik, Starvation and India's Democracy (London: Routledge, 2007). 
31 Thomas B. Smith, ‘India’s Electric Power Crisis: Why Do the Lights Go Out?,’ Asian Survey 33, no. 4 (1993): 
376–7.  
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democracy and scarcity in India means that the sector’s difficulties have more often revolved 
around distribution than simple supply—literally in this case, around the ‘last mile’ of low-
voltage electricity distribution to different categories of consumers. The fundamental drivers of 
this power crisis lay not (only) in an absolute scarcity of power generated, but in the politics of 
allocation that developed around access to the limited electricity supply, and which in turn 
helped to drive the sector further into crisis.  
Worldwide, the post-war years witnessed rapid expansion of physical electricity assets 
within broadly state-owned frameworks. A commitment to fossil capitalism was no prerequisite: 
the Soviet Union’s first-ever strategy for state-led development and the prototype for later Five-
Year Plans, the GOELRO plan, focused on a distinctively centralized mode of electrification as 
the pillar of economic modernization, although not until after 1926 did it accelerate (from a 
very low, foreign-dominated base under tsarist rule).32 Lenin’s famous formula for communism, 
‘soviet power plus the electrification of the whole country’, would later be frequently invoked in 
India’s Constituent Assembly debates around independence. India’s installed capacity grew 
eightfold and actual generation tenfold during the first two decades of its own Five-Year Plan 
system. During these early years, electrification continued to follow the patterns of privilege 
established in the colonial period. As in the global North, industrial consumers’ bulk tariffs were 
lower than those of residential consumers, in accordance with Nehruvian India’s intensifying 
vision of economic development driven by heavy industry, the public sector, and technological 
                                                       
32 Jonathan Coopersmith, The Electrification of Russia, 1880–1926 (Ithaca; London: Cornell University Press, 
1992), 151–91. Nonetheless, the broad relationship between democracy and electrification holds true in the 
longer term: a large-n study found that, while poor countries experienced legacy infrastructural benefits from 
central planning, across formerly planned economies this came at the cost of long-term ‘quality handicaps’; see 
Wendy Carlin, Mark Schaffer, and Paul Seabright, ‘Soviet Power Plus Electrification: What Is the Long-Run 
Legacy of Communism?,’ Explorations in Economic History 50, no. 1 (2013): 134. 
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progress.33 The icon of this development in the early phase was non-fossil, however: mega-scale 
hydroelectric dams, Nehru’s famous ‘temples of modern India’. 
Yet, as in the wider economy and society, the need to accommodate non-industrial elites 
began to undermine the Nehruvian project of socioeconomic transformation.34 A distinctly 
different tariff pattern began to emerge from the mid-1960s, as non-industrial users instead 
received increasingly large subsidies. Much of the inter- and post-war world had granted power 
policy an increased emphasis on social objectives and distribution goals rather than narrow 
profitability. In India power had already been bracketed in the same ministry as irrigation, and 
the rise of concerns about food security after the droughts of the 1960s only solidified this 
linkage. The ensuing Green Revolution policies helped to spread irrigated agriculture via electric 
tubewells and pumpsets; their numbers leapt from 192,000 in 1960–1 to over 1 million in 
1968–9, solidifying an ‘energy-irrigation nexus’. Agricultural power consumption grew at an 
annual average compound rate of over 14 percent in the decade after 1960–1. India thereby 
became the largest groundwater user in the world, dwarfing even the United States and China 
and creating a burgeoning environmental crisis.  
If cross-subsidization in, for example, the United States had sought to accelerate the 
electrification of the most marginal rural households, in India the subsidies ‘leaked’ to wealthier 
recipients. This was not accidental. India had inherited from the British a federal division of 
powers over electricity, confirmed in the much-debated Electricity (Supply) Act of 1948.35 This 
left the crucial distribution segment in the hands of State-level governments. The key institutions 
                                                       
33 While the 1956 Industrial Policy Resolution confirmed public-sector dominance of electricity, pre-existing 
private generation firms such as CESC continued to be tolerated. On the ‘fetishistic’ reliance of the Nehruvian 
regime on massive monuments to modernity and scientific progress such as mega-dams and atomic reactors, see 
Itty Abraham, The Making of the Indian Atomic Bomb: Science, Secrecy and the Postcolonial State (London; 
New York: Zed Books, 1998). 
34 The classic exposition of this argument is Francine R. Frankel, India’s Political Economy, 1947–1977: The 
Gradual Revolution (Princeton; Guildford: Princeton University Press, 1978).  
35 For an excellent analysis of this federal settlement and the regionally variegated political economies it 
fostered, see Kale, Electrifying India. 
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were State electricity boards (SEBs), vertically integrated monopolies usually lacking insulation 
from political administrations. As Min suggests, policymakers who must rely on reelection are 
more likely to provide public goods than their insulated, unelected counterparts—and where 
possible they will seek to leverage this provision for electoral gain.36 
Accordingly, the rural shift in tariffs was regionally variegated. It was especially striking 
in States where farmer lobbies were powerful, such as Punjab, Haryana, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat, 
western Maharashtra, and western Uttar Pradesh. In the 1960s these groups formed the bedrock 
of the earliest resistance to the ruling Congress’s one-party dominance at the national level. If 
farmers mobilized to protect their interests, State-level politicians—often drawn from wealthy 
agrarian classes themselves—in turn benefited electorally from catering to this powerful voting 
bloc. In the context of increasing party-political competition, agricultural power subsidies 
became a recognized political idiom. Their origins appear to lie in Punjab, where the Congress 
lost its majority for the first time in 1967; the administration introduced flat-rate (unmetered) 
consumption the following year, a practice that quickly spread to other politically competitive 
States.37 Less dramatically, too, middle-class residential consumers underpaid for their power, 
though their growing size made this subsidy a substantial financial burden upon State 
governments.38 Once introduced, power subsidies only reinforced the strength of farmer and 
                                                       
36 Min, Power and the Vote. 
37 For example, by the early 1970s Tamil Nadu saw fierce competition between two regional parties, each 
offering ever lower agricultural tariffs; Andhra Pradesh followed later that decade with its own brand of 
competitive ‘electric populism’; see Kale, Electrifying India, 170, 142. Conversely, one-party communist 
dominance in West Bengal between 1977 and 2011 helped to facilitate higher agricultural tariffs there than 
elsewhere; see Elizabeth Chatterjee, ‘The Politics of Electricity Reform’, World Development 104: 128–139 
(2018). 
38 Although farmer subsidies have received most scholarly attention, domestic subsidies remain sizeable. In 
2010, 87 percent of all residential electricity consumption was subsidized, accounting for almost a quarter of all 
consumption and 0.4 percent of GDP. In 2011–12, the all-India average tariff for domestic consumers was 314 
paise/kWh, compared to 144 for agricultural, 514 for industrial, and 690 for commercial consumers. Domestic 
subsidies were estimated to cost Rs. 37,047 crore nationwide, compared to Rs. 57,901 crore for agricultural 
subsidies. Data from Kristy Mayer, Sudeshna Ghosh Banerjee, and Chris Trimble, Elite Capture: Residential 
Tariff Subsidies in India (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), 32, ix; Planning Commission, Annual Report 
(2013–14) on the Working of State Electricity Boards & Electricity Departments (New Delhi: Government of 
India, 2014), 195, 208–11.  
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middle-class groups, and politicians’ incentives to continue delivering the subsidies as a symbol 
of their commitment to such interests. Farmers were swift to mobilize around any threat to 
reduce subsidies through protest marches and other extra-electoral action, while politicians 
competing for votes drove tariffs ever lower—virtually to zero, as in Tamil Nadu. At the same 
time the Nehruvian preference for mega-dams increasingly ran into opposition from landholders 
and environmentalists alike, accelerating the country’s turn towards coal (nationalized in 1971–
3 in the name of improved productivity and working conditions).  
This pattern of consumer subsidies looked quite different to that which predominated in 
the global North, where industrial and commercial consumers—fossil capitalists—continued to 
be favoured with cheap bulk tariffs. Instead, the older urban bias of Indian power policy was 
increasingly replaced by rural bias. Industrialists came to cross-subsidize this system through 
some of the world’s highest power tariffs. Accordingly, one of the most celebrated analyses of 
India’s political economy in the 1980s treated power subsidies as an archetypical symptom of 
the strength of wealthy farmers as they competed for state favours against India’s two other 
‘dominant proprietary classes’, industrial capitalists and the professional bureaucracy, the three 
classes together driving the state towards financial profligacy.39 As this suggested, the dominance 
of fossil capitalists was strongly challenged by other groups in ways which decommodified 
electricity, treating it as an entitlement rather than a paid service. Nonetheless, these rival 
groups were also elite. Even where they sought to use democratic channels to secure their 
influence, then, electric scarcity was far from democratic.  
Alongside skewed tariffs, this politics of scarcity also had more informal forms. First, 
electricity theft became virtually ubiquitous: almost 60 percent of Delhi’s power was going 
                                                       
39  Pranab Bardhan, The Political Economy of Development in India, expanded edition (Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 129–30. On the resilience of this political economy of subsidies into the twenty-first 
century, see Elizabeth Chatterjee, ‘The Limits of Liberalization: The Power Sector’, in India’s Political 
Economy, ed. R. Nagaraj and Sripad Motiram (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
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missing before the city privatized its electricity sector in 2002. The sheer quantity of stolen 
power suggested that poor users were less culpable than wealthy urban dwellers and even some 
industrialists. While illegal connections (‘hooking’) and amateur fraud (meter tampering) were 
contributors to this theft, frontline professionals also often received payoffs to reduce long waits 
for new connections or refuse bill payments.40 Rising levels of theft around elections confirm 
that this theft was institutionally tolerated and politicized.41  
Second, in the context of scarce supply power officials made strategic choices about 
managing demand through ‘load shedding’, or deliberate power cuts. While in some cases this 
targeted areas with high levels of power theft, it often spared politically influential constituencies 
or areas where politicians lived. At times this took the form of a ‘zero-sum game’ between 
industrial and more numerous users, with government-mandated power cuts targeting industrial 
rather than agricultural consumers.42 The economic impact on industry was substantial. Many 
larger firms resorted to their own captive generation to reduce dependence on the irregular and 
expensive public system. 
By 1991, the year of India’s ‘big-bang’ economic reforms, the result was a politically 
stable but economically and environmentally dysfunctional system. There developed a self-
perpetuating cycle of scarcity: cost under-recoveries from theft and subsidized consumption led 
to mounting financial losses and thus to dramatic shortages of cash for reinvestment; the 
ensuing poor performance further reduced consumers’ willingness to pay. The gap between 
demand and supply widened, while more than a half-century after independence the 2001 
census found that only 55.8 percent of households used electricity as their primary lighting 
                                                       
40 Thomas B. Smith, ‘Electricity Theft: A Comparative Analysis,’ Energy Policy 32, no. 18 (2004). Robert 
Wade’s classic analyses of irrigation suggest that this was merely the street level of an elaborate system of 
corruption and patronage. Many of these fees were likely funnelled upwards to superiors in a quid pro quo for 
access to public sector employment. See ‘The System of Administrative and Political Corruption: Canal 
Irrigation in South India,’ Journal of Development Studies 18, no. 3 (1982). 
41 Brian Min and Miriam Golden, ‘Electoral Cycles in Electricity Losses in India,’ Energy Policy 65 (2014). 
42 Kale, Electrifying India, 149. 
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source. If power policy favoured certain elites—albeit within a low-level equilibrium that in the 
longer term was suboptimal for all users—it was not the industrial capitalists of the 
Capitalocene thesis who were the prime beneficiaries. Instead, the scarcity of electricity 
combined with the corrosive political economy of power subsidies to prevent the consolidation 
of fossil capitalism.  
 
4.  Governing scarcity 
If societal contests over scarce power threatened fossil capitalists’ access to this key energy 
input, the distortionary effects of scarcity also reached deep into the state itself, in ways that 
would perpetuate and exacerbate shortages. Administering scarcity is in some sense the 
organizing principle of all mainstream economics and public policy planning, as noted elsewhere 
in this volume. Yet neoclassical economic rationality—the archetypical capitalist mode of public 
governance—developed in parallel with the high noon of fossil capitalism and the prospect of 
limitless growth that abundant energy promised. Mitchell goes as far as to argue that there was 
no such concept as ‘the economy’ before the development of grid electricity or cheap oil.43 
Capitalocene literature similarly argues that one of the hallmarks of fossil capitalism was its 
commodification of the natural world: the gradual extension of prices and ‘the cash nexus’ to 
everything, dating this moment to colonial expansion in particular.44 Again, then, how did this 
capitalistic ideology of public governance fare where the expansionary dynamic that underlay it 
in the global North was missing? 
In the Indian power sector, the endemic and highly politicized character of scarcity 
helped to undermine the consistent application of a recognizably capitalistic mindset in 
                                                       
43 Mitchell, ‘Rethinking Economy,’ Geoforum 39, no. 3 (2008); Carbon Democracy. While Fredrik Albritton 
Jonsson disputes Mitchell’s belated dating, he agrees that mainstream postwar economics rests on a promise of 
cornucopianism; see ‘The Origins of Cornucopianism: A Preliminary Genealogy,’ Critical Historical Studies 1, 
no. 1 (2014): 152. 
44 See especially Jason W. Moore, ‘The Rise of Cheap Nature,’ in Anthropocene or Capitalocene? Nature, 
History, and the Crisis of Capitalism, ed. Jason W. Moore (Oakland, CA: PM Press, 2016). 
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electricity governance, either at the state apex or within the implementing bureaucracy. Inside 
the public electricity utilities, the logic governing power was ‘administrative’ rather than 
economically rational—the organizational corollary of fossil developmentalism rather than fossil 
capitalism. As the French economist Joël Ruet found after years of ethnographic research, ‘what 
is decided on paper counts more than what actually happens’; SEB officials typically operated in 
a system driven by procedures and paperwork, in which cost–benefit analysis and profitability 
was an ‘alien notion’.45 They consequently failed to take simple profitable measures like timely 
repairs, preventive servicing, or anticipated investments. Meanwhile, under pressure from 
political administrations data were massaged. Figures on electricity theft were systematically 
depressed. Losses were instead attributed to subsidies on wealthy farmers, costs which SEBs 
could at least in theory claim back from State governments, although many of the latter did not 
reimburse them in full.46 State politicians meanwhile exploited soft budget constraints, the 
classic moral hazard of the socialist ‘economy of shortages’, knowing that they would rarely be 
penalized for their short-termist financial management.47  
As in the Soviet Union,48 the apex planning apparatus began to give way under such 
persistent difficulties with implementation and faulty data. Under pressure to display results in 
accordance with the apex vision of fossil developmentalism, power planning increasingly 
became a utopian ritual detached from these realities, explaining away failure while setting 
unrealistically ambitious targets to correct for past shortfalls. In 1983 the Planning 
Commission’s own journal, Yojana, lamented the ‘total chaos’ in power planning: ‘If one were 
to cite an example where the government says one thing and acts quite differently while 
                                                       
45 Joël Ruet, Privatising Power Cuts? Ownership and Reform of State Electricity Boards in India (New Delhi: 
Academic Foundation; Centre de Sciences Humaines, 2005), 46, 43. 
46 This was evidenced by the sudden upward spike in transmission and distribution loss figures across States as 
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47 János Kornai, Economics of Shortage, 2 vols. (Amsterdam; London: North-Holland, 1980). State-level power 
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48 See, for example, Alec Nove, ‘The Problem of “Success Indicators” in Soviet Industry,’ Economica 25, no. 97 
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implementing, the energy sector may take the cake.’49 Glorious futures were projected on paper, 
while in reality targets were missed with glaring consistency (Table 1). Not only did the 
contested politics of distribution shift to the detriment of fossil capitalists, then, but managing 
resource allocations in the context of electrical, financial, and human capital shortages also 
placed intolerable demands upon the state administration, in which the conventional economic 
rationality of profit maximization was subordinated to alternative logics.  
 
Table 1. Repeatedly missed targets in the power sector 




84.6 64.3 64.2 49.5 81.6 72.3 96.2 53.8 47.5 51.76 69.84 
Figures from the Planning Commission’s Five-Year Plans (New Delhi: Government of India, 
various years) 
 
 By the economic opening of 1991, the power sector’s problems were obvious and widely 
acknowledged. Power generation was the first major sector opened to private investment that 
year, ushering in a quarter-century of attempted reforms. Yet the multiple and overlapping 
character of scarcities in the power system complicated any solution. Policymakers often 
misdiagnosed or misprioritized the core scarcities, so that reforms either failed to tackle scarcity 
or even produced simultaneous overabundance and scarcity in different segments of this 
complex industry. In this way the politicized allocation of electricity between competing elites 
and the failures of apex power planning interacted to perpetuate the sector’s persistent low-
grade crisis. 
 The initial phase of reforms after 1991—the introduction of independent power 
producers (IPPs)—targeted the generation segment. This measure, attempted in many Asian 
                                                       
49 Quoted in Smith, ‘India’s Power Crisis,’ 381. See also Elizabeth Chatterjee, ‘Dissipated Energy: Indian 
Electric Power and the Politics of Blame,’ Contemporary South Asia 20, no. 1 (2012).  
20 
countries, nominally echoed the early stages of a model developed in the global North which fit 
the pattern of abundance and commodification highlighted above. Developed in England & 
Wales (alongside New Zealand) in the 1980s, pre-existing cheap infrastructure and cheap North 
Sea gas permitted the introduction of competitive markets that treated electricity as a 
commodity rather than a core service. Under the aegis of the World Bank, this post-Keynesian 
energy regime would become consolidated into a blueprint for global power reform.50 
 In India, however, the rationale for reform was quite different to the solidifying 
commodification framework. By 1991 the country was facing a serious balance-of-payments 
crisis and turned to the International Monetary Fund for an emergency loan. The balance-of-
payments crisis became the lens through which the dilemmas of the power sector were reframed. 
Not the mismanagement and politicization of distribution but scarce finance was the overriding 
concern, as became evident when the reform amendment was introduced in Parliament.51 The 
IPP policy ill fit the sector’s more fundamental problems, neglecting entirely the distribution 
segment. Its appeal lay in the perceived need to access capital, especially foreign finance, and to 
increase generation at virtually any cost.  
This concern with increasing generation capacity—‘pouring more water in the leaky 
bucket’, in one commentator’s memorable phrase52—has been a hallmark of Indian power 
reforms. Renewable energy sources have been persistently plagued by underinvestment in 
transmission infrastructure, which has left assets underutilized or exacerbated grid instability 
problems, for example in Tamil Nadu’s prodigiously wind-heavy power system. The ultra mega 
                                                       
50 See World Bank, The World Bank’s Role in the Electric Power Sector (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993). 
51 Kale, Electrifying India, 54. 
52 Deepak Parekh, then chairman of the Infrastructure Development Finance Corporation, quoted in N. 
Ramakrishnan, ‘Decade of Power Reforms—Hardly Electrifying,’ Hindu Business Line, 4 September 2001.  
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power projects of the 2000s or the recent surge in private thermal capacity have also continually 
run up against the old problems of subsidy politics in many States.53 
Later phases of power reform did belatedly attempt to tackle the politics of distribution, 
first through restructuring SEBs and the import of independent regulatory agencies, and later 
through ambitious legislation. Since the Electricity Act of 2003, the Government of India has 
hoped that competition—primarily through ‘open access’ to the retail market for large 
consumers—would force power governance reform. Distribution remains the purview of the 
State governments, however, which are typically loath to alienate the sizeable and wealthy 
constituencies who currently benefit from subsidized tariffs and theft, yet equally loath to lose 
lucrative industrial and commercial consumers; they have all but blocked open access in 
practice. More than this, competition may be structurally difficult to legislate: it requires good 
data, a serious private sector presence, improved governance, and pricing reforms—all of which 
remain in scarce supply.  
The persistent crisis of power distribution has led to the coexistence of abundance in 
some sectors with continued scarcity at the street level. Recently the crisis of coal supply for 
thermal power plants that characterized the first half of this decade has abruptly shifted in the 
face of swifter mining by the state-owned behemoth Coal India Limited. Today India instead 
faces a major glut of thermal power, with up to one-third of plants lying idle and power sold on 
exchanges at rates that barely cover the cost of fuel.54 State governments proudly announce that 
they now enjoy a ‘power surplus’. This privately sponsored crisis of overinvestment, mirroring 
China’s state-driven glut, will only be exacerbated by the current push for a vast expansion of 
renewable energy.  
                                                       
53 See Navroz Dubash, Sunila Kale, and Ranjit Bharvirkar (eds.) Mapping Power: The Political Economy of 
Electricity in India’s States (Delhi: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).  
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This counterintuitive situation bespeaks the absence of the cost-benefit rationale that is 
argued to have historically accompanied the Northern avatars of fossil capitalism.55 On the one 
hand, private firms did not always behave with long-term engagement in the sector in mind. 
Rather, ‘every Tom, Dick, and Harry’ poured into the thermal power sector, including many 
steel and cotton companies with no commercial power experience, hoping to exploit or 
speculate upon cheap loans and preferential access to state-administered coal blocks.56 The 
result of this irrational exuberance was a rising proportion of stranded assets and 
nonperforming loans, especially in public sector banks.  
More fundamentally, the politicized problems of the distribution segment remain an 
overriding constraint in many States, and overlap with the alternative rationalities of power 
governance that emerged to manage scarcity. Faced with political unwillingness to reduce the 
subsidy burden and haemorrhaging cash, the huge, impoverished State of Uttar Pradesh has at 
times all but given up on power procurement planning and instead resorted to the type of 
unscheduled over-drawing from the inter-State grid that helped cause the world-record 
blackouts of July 2012. Meanwhile, utility officials in the poor (but coal-rich) eastern State of 
Jharkhand appear to operate with a fixed maximum amount of spending in mind: today they 
are opting to ration power even while cheap sources are available via short-term markets. 
Elsewhere demand remains constrained by absent connections and high costs. One official thus 
complained that State-level boasts about power surplus were ‘like saying India is a beef-surplus 
country when it is mostly vegetarian’:57 on-paper abundance masks persistent inequalities of 
access to and underinvestment in electricity. India’s fragmented federal polity thus continues to 
stymie the development of a fossil-capitalist power system in many areas.  
                                                       
55 Cases such as the collapse of Enron might warn us against exaggerating the longer-term cost-benefit 
rationality of Euro-American energy firms, however. 
56 Power Trading Corporation official, quoted in M. Rajshekhar, ‘Chhattisgarh Power Boom That Never Was,’ 
Economic Times, 25 October 2012.  
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India’s economic trajectory has itself been reshaped by these features. The absolute 
scarcity of electricity combined with mismanagement and the corrosive political economy of 
power subsidies to prevent the consolidation of fossil capitalism in its traditional form. 
Businesses consistently report that India’s unreliable power supply is the biggest obstacle to their 
sustained economic growth, more so than taxation or corruption.58 They have compensated in 
ways that distinctively shifted Indian industrialization away from the exemplary ‘Capitalocene’ 
cases of Britain and the United States. Infrastructure bottlenecks, electricity prime among them, 
helped to undermine the development of a large manufacturing sector like that in China. Instead 
the Indian economy today has been characterized by ‘jobless growth’ and a reliance on services, 
including dense clusters of IT firms with their own private power supplies. In place of traditional 
factories where industrialists bore the costs of power cuts, large firms sought to shift the risk 
onto small subcontractors who could compensate through power theft or by exploiting 
unwaged family labour. The result was an expansion of India’s vast and growing informal 
economy, estimated to account for up to 90 percent of livelihoods today. Most recently, 
ambitious projections for demand growth made a decade ago have failed to materialize. 
Although on paper India is now the world’s fastest-growing major economy, in practice power 
demand—especially from industrialists—is not rising in line with these figures as historical 
precedent would lead us to expect. In such ways the shape of India’s fossil capitalism was 
fundamentally altered by electric scarcities: not solely or even primarily the ‘hard’ scarcity of 
limited fuel supplies or power generation capacity, but by the competitive political economy of 
scarce electricity allocation, and the troubled planning apparatus for managing shortages.  
 
5.  Conclusion  
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While the dilemma of abundance forms the backdrop to climate change in the global North, 
electricity in India has throughout its history been characterized by multiple and overlapping 
scarcities of capital, technology, personnel, lucrative consumers, and natural resources. Looking 
at this critical case, the dynamics and hegemony of fossil capitalism look quite different to the 
assumptions of the Capitalocene narrative. The foregoing analysis has troubled three elements 
of this narrative: the spread of electricity as a key macro-technology of fossil capitalism; the 
degree of dominance enjoyed by fossil capitalists over this crucial industrial input; and the 
expansion of a capitalistic economic rationality that seeks to commodify energy, and indeed all 
of ‘nature’, within a profit-making framework. 
Against the Capitalocene assumption that the European mode of production was 
disseminated in a seamless and mechanistic manner, the British imperial government in the 
subcontinent was surprisingly indifferent to electrification. Grid electricity was installed only 
haphazardly across a few favoured areas, often relying on local entrepreneurship. This unsettles 
the notion of any simple relationship between colonialism, fossil capitalism, and climate change. 
Instead colonialism produced a new scarcity in electricity both through the visible successes of 
electrified, industrial modernity in the metropole and the relative neglect of electrification in the 
peripheries, as nationalists argued. The relative scarcities produced by lack of technology 
transfer became a defining feature of the construction of a ‘developing world’.  
Even after independence in 1947, fossil capitalists did not enjoy a consistent acceleration 
of electricity provision. Questions of distribution became politicized and institutionally 
conditioned by the democratic context and federal structure. A distinctive politics of elite 
democratic mobilization and power rationing emerged across many Indian states, in which 
subsidized overuse coincided with deliberate cuts, penalizing industry alongside the hundreds of 
millions of Indians left without access to the grid. The public management of such endemic 
scarcity looked very different to the economic rationality that emerged to govern the abundant 
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resources of the global North. Against the equation of the Anthropocene with capitalist 
commodification, electrification did not coincide with the installation of a commercial, cost-
benefit logic across the country. In many utilities, scarcity was not conceptualized in purely 
economic terms. Instead, the public management of scarcity was guided by a noneconomic 
rationality shaped around administrative protocols and political exigencies. Simultaneously, 
scarcity contracted political time horizons. Power planning became increasingly divorced from 
the realities of short-term, zero-sum calculations around regional political economies of resource 
allocation and soft budget constraints. Fierce competition for scarce resources thus undermined 
long-term ‘developmental’ state planning and market-based policies alike.  
Alongside the ‘hard’ absolute scarcity of electricity generated, the underperformance of 
India’s electricity sector shows the importance of ‘soft’, politically mediated scarcity created by 
inequalities of access and the institutional complex that evolved to govern them. This distinction 
has often been neglected by Indian policymakers, who have often favoured the easier solution of 
increasing generation capacity over the riskier work of subsidy rollbacks or organizational 
reform. As this suggests, scarcity’s multiple forms (physical, financial, human capital, and more) 
have led to misdiagnoses of the sector’s problems, so that overabundance and scarcity have 
come paradoxically to coincide. Nonetheless, the line between hard and soft scarcities is blurred. 
Both are manmade. Both are inseparable from the external world, whether through natural 
resource constraints, electricity’s physical characteristics (such as the inevitability of technical 
losses during low-voltage distribution), and their environmental implications. And both are 
mutually conditioning, as conditions of persistent hard scarcity shape demand politics and 
governance, and subsidies and mismanagement in turn discourage investments upstream. 
India’s variant of fossil developmentalism was itself reshaped by the pressures of the 
politically mediated scarcity of electricity. This and other infrastructural bottlenecks helped to 
discourage the conventional growth of factory-based manufacturing in favour of services and a 
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vast informal economy in which own-account workers shouldered the risk of breakdowns. 
None of these features—electricity’s dissemination around the subcontinent, the political 
economy of the Indian power sector, the non-commercial logic of power governance, and 
India’s unusual industrial trajectory—are well captured by Anthropocene-Capitalocene 
literature derived from Euro-American experiences founded on energy abundance.  
 Meanwhile, the threat of climate change itself has prompted a move to revalue scarcity. 
India’s dysfunctional power system had one beneficial side effect from a long-term, global 
perspective: energy production and consumption was constrained. Such energy-scarce late 
development has been reconfigured as a moment of opportunity to move beyond fossil 
capitalism and its environmental consequences, either to alternative fuels or, more radically, 
towards more parsimonious modes of living. In this vein India’s power cuts are occasionally 
reinterpreted with only a little irony as a prodigiously well-developed system of ‘demand-side 
management’. Nonetheless, the domestic allure of this revaluation is limited. The right to 
overcome the persistent scarcity of power—to ‘develop’—has long remained the pillar of India’s 
international climate negotiating stance.59 Abundant electricity is at present a non-negotiable 
component of modernity. The history of electrification in India thus illustrates the complexity of 
the much-debated relationships between voracious energy consumption and industrial 
capitalism, colonialism, and democracy outside the global North—relationships which look 
unlikely to become less fraught in the near future. As revealed here, the postcolonial 
Anthropocene is defined as much by the perception of relative scarcity as by the dilemma of 
abundance. 
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